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Article 
Social Influences on Policy Preferences: 
Conformity and Reactance 
Meirav Furth-Matzkin∗ & Cass R. Sunstein† 
  INTRODUCTION   
It is well-known that in general, people’s judgments, choic-
es, and decisions are greatly influenced by social norms.1 Clas-
sic research has shown that social norms may influence our 
stated views about the lengths of lines, and even our ability to 
discriminate among colors.2 There is also evidence that people 
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 1. By now, multiple studies have documented this phenomenon. For no-
table examples, see infra Part I. 
 2. See, e.g., Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A 
Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1, 
68–70 (1956) (finding that people are influenced by their peers’ views about 
the length of lines). See also SERGE MOSCOVICI, SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND SO-
CIAL CHANGE 54–55 (Carol Sherrard & Greta Heinz trans., 1976) (finding that 
people’s ability to distinguish between colors is also affected by their peers’ 
opinions).  
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adjust their behavior to conform with the behavior of others, 
and that social norms (and specifically public opinion) may af-
fect people’s moral judgments as well.3 At the same time, re-
search on the influence of social norms on people’s policy pref-
erences remains scarce.4 This Article examines whether 
exposure to information about public opinion may affect peo-
ple’s policy judgments in significant ways. In short, we find 
that it does. People often move in the direction of conformity 
with public opinion. But in some contexts, they do not—and 
they might even show reactance.5 
 
 3. See, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel Walker, Laws and Moral Judg-
ments, 30 SOCIOMETRY 410, 421–22 (1967) (finding that one’s moral judgments 
concerning different forms of conduct, like homosexual relationships, are sig-
nificantly affected by the opinion of one’s peers; and that the “peer consensus” 
effect is greater than the effect of knowledge as to the existence of criminal 
laws regarding the specified behavior). 
 4. Relatively few studies address this issue. For notable exceptions, see 
Matthew J. Hornsey et al., On Being Loud and Proud: Non-Conformity and 
Counter-Conformity to Group Norms, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 319 (2003) 
(examining the influence of group norms on Australian students’ attitudes to-
ward recognition of gay couples and government apology to Aborigines, and 
finding that people are influenced by the group norm, even with respect to at-
titudes of social significance, but may experience counterconformity if their 
attitude has a strong moral basis); Joanne R. Smith & Winnifred R. Louis, Do 
as We Say and as We Do: The Interplay of Descriptive and Injunctive Group 
Norms in the Attitude-Behaviour Relationship, 47 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 647 
(2008) (examining the relative effects of descriptive and injunctive norms, and 
in-group and out-group norms, in the context of different campus policies, such 
as the introduction of comprehensive examinations at Australian universities). 
 5. Reactance is generally defined as an individual’s negative response 
when a freedom has been threatened or lost. Reactance is typically inferred 
when people adopt a position or behavior opposite from the behavior or posi-
tion advocated or when they perceive the behavior or object associated with 
the threatened freedom to be more attractive. See, for example, SHARON S. 
BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREE-
DOM AND CONTROL 4 (1981) [hereinafter BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE] 
(stating, inter alia, that “[i]n addition to direct behavioral consequences, reac-
tance affects the subjective attractiveness of potential outcomes”); ROBERT A. 
WICKLUND, FREEDOM AND REACTANCE (1974); Thomas Hammock & Jack W. 
Brehm, The Attractiveness of Choice Alternatives when Freedom to Choose is 
Eliminated by a Social Agent, 34 J. PERSONALITY 546 (1966); Stephen A. 
Rains, The Nature of Psychological Reactance Revisited: A Meta-Analytic Re-
view, 39 HUM. COMM. RES. 47 (2013); Stephen Worchel & Jack W. Brehm, Ef-
fects of Threats to Attitudinal Freedom as a Function of Agreement with the 
Communicator, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 18 (1970). For example, 
raising the legal drinking age in the United States from nineteen to twenty-
one resulted in increased drinking rates among underaged college students. 
Ruth Engs & David J. Hanson, Reactance Theory: A Test with Collegiate 
Drinking, 64 PSYCHOL. REP. 1083, 1085 (1989). 
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In a series of experimental studies, we randomly assigned 
participants to two different “majority opinion” conditions (“ma-
jority support” and “majority opposition”) and asked them to 
state their opinion about various proposed governmental poli-
cies. Under the majority-support condition, participants were 
asked to assume that most Americans supported the proposed 
policy, whereas under the majority-opposition condition they 
were asked to assume that most Americans opposed it. This ex-
perimental manipulation allowed us to test the effect of infor-
mation about the majority opinion on people’s support for dif-
ferent proposed policies. 
We focus throughout on “soft” (or libertarian paternalist) 
interventions in the form of nudges, generally understood as 
behaviorally informed interventions aimed at steering people in 
desired directions while preserving their freedom to choose.6 
These interventions—including informational campaigns, 
warnings (for example, about the risks of smoking) and default 
arrangements (such as automatic enrollment plans)—have 
gained significant attention, and have been used to promote so-
cial welfare in multiple countries during the last decade.7 
 
 6. For a general overview of nudges and their potential impact on peo-
ple’s behavior and welfare, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 
(2008). One well-known example of a nudge, which has been extensively im-
plemented in the United States, is automatic enrollment in retirement savings 
programs. In such programs, as soon as employees become eligible for the sav-
ings plan, they are automatically enrolled unless they explicitly opt out. This 
design—switching the default from “no participation” to “participation”—
counteracts employees’ procrastination and status-quo bias. See Brigitte C. 
Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Partici-
pation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001). For an elaborate 
definition of libertarian paternalism, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Tha-
ler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 
(2003). For a critical analysis of libertarian paternalism, see RICCARDO 
REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBERTARIAN PA-
TERNALISM (2012). 
 7. For a general overview of the use of behaviorally informed approaches 
in public policy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERN-
MENT (2013) (exploring applications of behavioral tools by regulatory agen-
cies); William J. Congdon & Maya Shankar, The White House Social & Behav-
ioral Sciences Team: Lessons Learned from Year One, 2 BEHAV. SCI. POL’Y 93 
(2016); David Halpern & Michael Sanders, Nudging by Government: Progress, 
Impact & Lessons Learnt, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 53 (2016) (exploring how be-
havioral insights have been applied by U.S. and U.K. government agencies to 
nudge individuals towards more economically beneficial choices); Brigitte C. 
Madrian, Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design, 6 
ANN. REV. ECON. 663 (2014) (exploring how behaviorally informed policy can 
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Nudges have been adopted as policy tools in a variety of im-
portant areas, including health care, environmental protection, 
and savings programs.8  
We focus on these interventions in part to keep the topic as 
tractable as possible, and in part on the ground that a growing 
body of work explores how people respond to such interventions 
in the absence of social influences.9 We expect, however, that 
 
remedy market failures that result from psychological biases, and assessing 
the impact and relative cost-effectiveness of behaviorally informed interven-
tions). For the use of warnings, disclosure mandates, and informational cam-
paigns, see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU 
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Ryan 
Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1021 (2015); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing 
Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006). For the use of default arrange-
ments, such as automatic enrollment plans, see Richard Thaler & Shlomo 
Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase 
Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164, S169, S183–86 (2004); Madrian & 
Shea, supra note 6. 
 8. For the use of such tools to promote health, see Julie S. Downs et al., 
Strategies for Promoting Healthier Food Choices, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 159 
(2009); Lucia A. Reisch, Cass R. Sunstein & Wencke Gwozdz, Beyond Carrots 
and Sticks: Europeans Support Health Nudges, 69 FOOD POL’Y 1 (2017). For 
the use of nudges to enhance environmental protection, see NEW PERSPEC-
TIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES THROUGH BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
(Frank Beckenbach & Walter Kahlenborn eds., 2016); Felix Ebeling & Sebas-
tian Lotz, Domestic Uptake of Green Energy Promoted by Opt-Out Tariffs, 5 
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 868 (2015); Simon Hedlin & Cass R. Sunstein, Does 
Active Choosing Promote Green Energy Use? Experimental Evidence, 43 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 107 (2016). For the use of nudges to increase employees’ savings, see 
Madrian & Shea, supra note 6; Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 7. 
 9. See, e.g., William Hagman et al., Public Views on Policies Involving 
Nudges, 6 REV. PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 439, 440–42 (2015) (examining public atti-
tudes toward multiple nudges, finding, for example, that people prefer pro-self  
over prosocial nudges); Janice Y. Jung & Barbara A. Mellers, American Atti-
tudes Toward Nudges, 11 J. JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 62, 62–63 (2016) 
(exploring the factors influencing people’s attitudes toward nudges, such as 
personality traits, cultural and social worldviews, and specific characteristics 
of nudges); Astrid F. Junghans et al., Under Consumers’ Scrutiny: An Investi-
gation Into Consumers’ Attitudes and Concerns About Nudging in the Realm of 
Health Behavior, 15 BMC PUB. HEALTH 336, 226 (2015) (exploring consumers’ 
knowledge and attitudes toward nudges in the United Kingdom, while focus-
ing on health nudges); Lucia A. Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Europeans Like 
Nudges?, 11 J. JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 310, 319–22 (2016) (finding 
that there is broad public support in various European nations for multiple 
kinds of nudges); Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 177, 222–23 (2016) (revealing a widespread support for nudges, at least 
of the kind that Democratic societies have employed or seriously considered in 
recent years); Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein, The People’s Perspective on 
Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies 26–27 (Oct. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/LP.pdf (exploring people’s attitudes to-
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our central findings would hold for more aggressive interven-
tions as well (with the qualifications discussed in Part IV). 
We find that the effect of majority opinion on people’s sup-
port of governmental policies depends largely on a single factor: 
whether people’s antecedent opinions on the matter are fixed 
and firm. People’s attitudes are likely to move in the direction 
of the majority in domains in which they lack clear convictions; 
when they have such convictions, the view of the majority mat-
ters less, and sometimes not at all. 
These findings are consistent with other evidence, both ex-
perimental and real world, that people are relatively impervi-
ous to social influences when their antecedent convictions are 
firm.10 For example, federal appellate judges are greatly influ-
enced by their panel colleagues in many areas of the law, but 
not in the context of abortion and capital punishment, where 
we can expect fixed convictions.11 Indeed, we find that in ideo-
logically contentious contexts, exposure to the majority opinion 
can even backfire. Disclosure of social norms might produce re-
actance on the part of the people belonging to the minority, 
thus intensifying their commitment to their original belief.12 
We offer preliminary evidence about the kinds of situations in 
which reactance will occur.13 
As we shall show, our findings have significant implica-
tions for policymakers who seek to build support for, or opposi-
tion to, certain policies or tools. In many contexts, a clear or 
 
ward various nudges, and finding, inter alia, that people prefer deliberative 
and educative nudges to intuitive or automatic interventions, even if the latter 
are proven more effective). 
 10. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIR-
ICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2007) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN ET 
AL., JUDGES]; Hornsey et al., supra note 4. These findings are also consistent 
with social judgment theory, which suggests that people who are highly in-
vested in a particular issue are less likely to be influenced than those who are 
not as invested. See, e.g., MUZAFER SHERIF & HADLEY CANTRIL, THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF EGO-INVOLVEMENTS: SOCIAL ATTITUDES & IDENTIFICATIONS 
(1947); MUZAFER SHERIF & CARL I. HOVLAND, SOCIAL JUDGMENT: ASSIMILA-
TION AND CONTRAST EFFECTS IN COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 
(1961). 
 11. SUNSTEIN ET AL., JUDGES, supra note 10, at 54–57. 
 12. Indeed, as Brehm & Brehm observe, “[r]eactance theory . . . . suggests 
that individuals will sometimes be motivated to resist or act counter to at-
tempted social influence, such as mass persuasion . . . .” See BREHM, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL REACTANCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 13. Our evidence is consistent with previous findings showing reactance. 
For references, see infra note 43. 
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pointed reference to the majority’s views can attract people to 
its position. But for some groups, the majority’s view will have 
no impact—and for others, it will even prove counterproductive. 
We offer a general qualification before we begin. The range 
of real-world policy issues is of course very large, even within 
the category of soft interventions, and we explore only a small 
subset of them here. Moreover, some of our results are merely 
suggestive. We do find effects for conformity, nonconformity, 
and reactance, but the magnitude of our findings is often rela-
tively small. For some of our hypotheses, the support must be 
taken as tentative. But in view of their connection with firmly 
established findings in other domains, not involving policy 
preferences,14 our expectation is that our findings would gener-
ally hold after more extensive investigation.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the back-
ground and motivation behind this project. It briefly surveys 
the literature on social influences, while focusing on the limited 
evidence indicating that social norms—and majority opinion in 
particular—may affect people’s policy judgments.  
In Part II, we report the findings of our first experimental 
study, showing that across a wide range of policies, people’s 
judgments are affected by the (perceived) majority opinion, and 
that they might experience reactance in ideologically conten-
tious cases. In Part III, we present a second experiment, whose 
findings suggest that the impact of the majority opinion on 
people’s policy judgments is moderated by the strength of their 
antecedent convictions. 
Part IV extends the previous studies in two ways. First, it 
investigates whether exposure to information on the majority 
opinion influences people’s attitudes not only toward policy ob-
 
 14. For conformity effects, see infra Part I. For reactance in other con-
texts, see, for example, Kareem Haggag & Giovanni Paci, Default Tips, 6 AM. 
ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 1, 16–17 (2014) (finding that higher default tip sug-
gestions in taxi cabs in New York led to lower likelihood of tipping, although 
the average tipping rates went up); Hedlin & Sunstein, supra note 8, 137–40 
(finding that participants presented with an active-choosing green policy were 
more likely to enroll in the green energy program than were those who were 
automatically defaulted to such a program and were provided the opportunity 
to opt out, thereby indicating reactance triggered by the use of defaults); 
Debra J. Ringold, Boomerang Effects in Response to Public Health Interven-
tions: Some Unintended Consequences in the Alcoholic Beverage Market, 25 J. 
CONSUMER POL’Y 27, 51–53 (2002) (finding reactance in the context of health 
interventions); Arad & Rubinstein, supra note 9, at 6–12 (finding that default 
rules may sometimes backfire in the context of employees’ savings plans). 
 2018] SOCIAL INFLUENCE ON POLICY PREFERENCE 1345 
 
jectives but also toward the policy tools by which these objec-
tives are to be advanced. Second, it further explores whether 
people show nonconformity or reactance to the (perceived) ma-
jority opinion when they discover that they hold a minority po-
sition. In Part V, we discuss the implications, limitations, and 
future directions of this research. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION   
Social norms, whether descriptive (what people think and 
how they behave) or injunctive (what people approve or disap-
prove of), influence people’s perceptions and behavior in mean-
ingful ways across a wide array of contexts.15 These include 
drug and alcohol use,16 violent conduct,17 volunteer work,18 
charity donation,19 physical exercise,20 and safe-sex behavior.21 
 
 15. See, for example, Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Norma-
tive Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public 
Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1024–25 (1990) (showing 
that social norms affect people’s littering behavior, while exploring the com-
parative power of injunctive and descriptive norms); Raymond R. Reno et al., 
The Transsituational Influence of Social Norms, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 104, 111 (1993) (comparing the power of injunctive and descriptive 
social norms in the context of littering behavior). 
 16. See Brian McMillan & Mark Conner, Applying an Extended Version of 
the Theory of Planned Behavior to Illicit Drug Use Among Students, 33 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1662, 1663–67 (2003); Clayton Neighbors et al., Target-
ing Misperceptions of Descriptive Drinking Norms: Efficacy of a Computer-
Delivered Personalized Normative Feedback Intervention, 72 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 434, 434–35 (2004). But see Henry Wechsler et al., Percep-
tion and Reality: A National Evaluation of Social Norms Marketing Interven-
tions to Reduce College Students’ Heavy Alcohol Use, 63 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 
484, 491–92 (2003) (finding that social norms marketing programs did not re-
duce alcohol use on college campuses).  
 17. See David Henry et al., Normative Influences on Aggression in Urban 
Elementary School Classrooms, 28 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 59, 61 (2000); 
Paul Norman et al., The Theory of Planned Behavior, Descriptive Norms, and 
the Moderating Role of Group Identification, 35 J. APPLIED SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 1008, 1010–12 (2005). 
 18. Jeni Warburton & Deborah J. Terry, Volunteer Decision Making by 
Older People: A Test of a Revised Theory of Planned Behavior, 22 BASIC & AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 245, 255 (2000) (finding that older people are likely to 
volunteer to fulfill perceived subjective and behavioral norms). 
 19. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, Social Comparisons and Pro-Social 
Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1717, 1720–21 (2004). 
 20. Ryan E. Rhodes & Kerry S. Courneya, Investigating Multiple Compo-
nents of Attitude, Subjective Norm, and Perceived Control: An Examination of 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour in the Exercise Domain, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 129, 142–43 (2003). 
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In particular, studies show that supplying people with in-
formation about how their peers or other community members 
behave may significantly affect their conduct.22 In some promi-
nent research, homeowners were provided with information 
comparing their energy use to that of their neighbors in order 
to promote household energy conservation. The central finding 
is that if people discover that their energy use is above the av-
erage energy consumption of people in similar conditions, they 
significantly reduce their energy use.23  
Similarly, studies of tax compliance find that informing 
taxpayers that most residents in their local area have already 
paid their taxes dramatically increases tax payment rates.24 A 
growing body of literature also documents peer effects in finan-
cial decision-making. Information about peers’ behavior influ-
ences people’s retirement savings choices,25 entrepreneurship 
decisions,26 and stock market participation.27 Lastly, studies 
 
 21. Katherine M. White et al., Safer Sex Behavior: The Role of Attitudes, 
Norms, and Control Factors, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2164, 2184–88 
(1994). 
 22. See, e.g., Cialdini et al., supra note 15, at 1024–25 (showing that in-
junctive and descriptive norms affect people’s littering behavior). 
 23. Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation, 95 J. PUB. 
ECON. 1082, 1084 (2011). Importantly, it is hard to specify the causal effect 
from this study, since the program combines social norms information with 
recommendations on how to reduce consumption, making it hard to distin-
guish between the effect of the social norms information, the tips on how to 
reduce consumption, and the increase in consumers’ awareness as a result of 
receiving the report. For critical analysis, see Daniel Schwartz et al., The 
Hawthorne Effect and Energy Awareness, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
15242, 15242–46 (2013) (finding that merely providing participants with re-
minders that they are participating in a study of household electricity use sig-
nificantly reduce their electricity use); George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: 
Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 408–09 (2014). See 
also Hunt Allcott & Todd Rogers, The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Be-
havioral Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation 4–5 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18492, 2013) (examining 
the long-run effects of behavioral interventions on consumers’ energy con-
sumption patterns). 
 24. Loewenstein, supra note 23, at 408 (citing the 2010–2011 annual re-
port of the Behavioral Insights team). 
 25. Esther Duflo & Emmanuel Saez, Participation and Investment Deci-
sions in Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues’ Choices, 85 J. PUB. 
ECON. 121, 145–46 (2002). 
 26. Josh Lerner & Ulrike Malmendier, With a Little Help From My (Ran-
dom) Friends: Success and Failure in Post-Business School Entrepreneurship, 
26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2411, 2446–47 (2013). 
 27. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Neighbors Matter: Causal Community Effects 
and Stock Market Participation, 63 J. FIN. 1509, 1530 (2008); Harrison Hong 
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have found that providing information about peer conduct may 
shift people’s behavior toward the norm in domains related to 
preferences and tastes, such as music downloads and even res-
taurant menu selections.28  
In light of the evident power of social norms, the past two 
decades have seen a surge of studies examining the effective-
ness of programs delivering information about these norms in 
order to encourage prosocial behavior in areas such as littering, 
gambling, recycling, environmental conservation, voting, and 
charitable donation.29 But in spite of pervasive evidence that 
social norms affect people’s perceptions and behavior, there is 
relatively little research on the potential role of social norms, 
and majority opinion in particular, in shaping people’s policy 
preferences.30 Research on the impact of majority opinion on 
 
et al., Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation, 59 J. FIN. 137, 161–
62 (2004). For a broader review of the literature on herding, peer effects, and 
related phenomena in financial decision-making, see generally John Beshears 
et al., The Effect of Providing Peer Information on Retirement Savings Deci-
sions, 70 J. FIN. 1161 (2015); David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Herd Be-
haviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: A Review and Synthesis, 9 EUR. 
FIN. MGMT. 25 (2003). 
 28. Hongbin Cai et al., Observational Learning: Evidence from a Random-
ized Natural Field Experiment, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 864, 886 (2009) (showing 
the effect of social norms on entrée selection in restaurants); Matthew J. Sal-
ganik et al., Leading the Herd Astray: An Experimental Study of Self-fulfilling 
Prophecies in an Artificial Cultural Market, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 338, 341 
(2008) (showing the effect of social norms on music downloads). 
 29. Frey & Meier, supra note 19, at 1717; Alan S. Gerber & Todd Rogers, 
Descriptive Social Norms and Motivation to Vote: Everybody’s Voting and so 
Should You, 71 J. POL. 178, 187–88 (2009) (describing how people are more 
likely to vote after hearing that other people are voting); Noah Goldstein et al., 
A Room With a Viewpoint: Using Normative Appeals to Motivate Environmen-
tal Conservation Behaviors in a Hotel Setting, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 472, 477 
(2008) (discussing a study showing how hotel guests exposed to descriptive 
norms were more environmentally conscious); Mary E. Larimer et al., Norma-
tive Misperception and the Impact of Descriptive and Injunctive Norms on Col-
lege Student Gambling, 17 PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 235, 241 (2003) 
(showing that the more prevalent people though gambling was, the more likely 
they were to gamble); P. Wesley Schultz, Changing Behavior with Normative 
Feedback Interventions: A Field Experiment on Curbside Recycling, 21 BASIC & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 32 (1999) (indicating that “group feedback and in-
dividual feedback” increased tendencies towards recycling); P. Wesley Schultz 
et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social 
Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 432–33 (2007) (“longer-term results indicate 
that the effects of the normative messages continued to be strong even 4 weeks 
after the initial intervention.”). 
 30. See supra note 4, for preliminary evidence as to the effect of social 
norms in such contexts. 
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people’s attitudes toward soft governmental interventions is 
particularly scarce, in spite of the growing prominence of such 
interventions in public policy.31 
Importantly, social norms have been shown to affect peo-
ple’s moral judgments in various domains. In a classic study 
conducted by Berkowitz and Walker in the United Kingdom in 
1967, peer consensus—overwhelming approval or disapproval 
of homosexuality—led to a greater shift in moral judgments 
than exposure to information about legal rules defining homo-
sexuality as legal or illegal.32 Similarly, the political science lit-
erature has examined the effect of exposure to political polls 
(and, by proxy, public opinion) on voting behavior.33 Studies 
have found that after being exposed to political polls, voters’ 
preferences may shift in the direction of the leading candidate 
in what has been termed the “bandwagon effect”34—or instead 
move towards the losing candidate in what has been termed the 
“underdog effect.”35 These findings suggest that public opinion 
may play a role in shaping people’s policy judgments. 
 
 31. There is, however, preliminary experimental evidence as to the impact 
of political cues on people’s support for, or opposition to, behavioral policy in-
terventions. See David Tannenbaum et al., On the Misplaced Politics of Behav-
ioural Policy Interventions, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3–5 (2017). 
 32. Berkowitz & Walker, supra note 3. 
 33. For a thorough overview of the political sciences literature on this is-
sue, see Diana C. Mutz, Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of 
Public Opinion on Political Attitudes, 14 POL. BEHAV. 89, 91–92 (1992). 
 34. See, e.g., PAUL FELIX LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE: HOW 
THE VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, 120–21, 150–
51 (1944) (exploring the roles of interpersonal interactions and the media in 
shaping people’s opinions on election candidates); Catherine Marsh, Back on 
the Bandwagon: The Effect of Opinion Polls on Public Opinion, 15 BRIT. J. 
POL. SCI. 51, 52–53 (1985) (showing that exposure to poll trends can have a 
significant effect on an individual’s own view); Robert Navazio, An Experi-
mental Approach to Bandwagon Research, 41 PUB. OPINION Q. 217, 219 (1977) 
(finding that exposure to a national poll may generate a bandwagon effect on 
some groups, and an opposite effect on others). 
 35. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Edward L. Kain, Jumping on the Band-
wagon with the Underdog: The Impact of Attitude Polls on Polling Behavior, 
46 PUB. OPINION Q. 228, 239–40 (1982) (examining people’s views towards 
candidates after exposure to national polls, indicating that this can lead to a 
decrease in support for the dominant candidate even when it does not lead to 
support for less dominant candidates, in what is termed “oppositional reactivi-
ty”); Daniel W. Fleitas, Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal-
Information Elections, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 434, 438 (1971) (finding that ex-
posure to polling information can be insufficient and that a qualitative stimu-
lus is required to produce support for underdog candidates in minimal-
information elections such as local non-partisan contests). See generally POLL-
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In this article we experimentally explore the impact of ex-
posure to information about the majority opinion on people’s at-
titudes toward different governmental policies in various do-
mains, mainly focusing on “soft” libertarian policies, or 
nudges.36 It has been found that without exposure to the views 
of others, people generally support such policies when they are 
perceived as promoting legitimate goals, as reflecting widely-
held beliefs, or as enhancing the interests or values of the ma-
jority.37 Our question here is simple: Does merely informing 
people that the majority of the public supports or opposes such 
policies affect support for these policies? 
In theory, disclosure of information about the majority 
opinion may influence people’s views for two familiar reasons: 
(1) Informational Signal. Public opinion provides infor-
mation about what most people think is right or good, and may 
reveal information relevant to a person’s conclusions.38 To that 
extent, it can serve as a heuristic for determining the right an-
swer or the optimal solution. On one view, crowds are wise, and 
so individuals rationally defer to them. 
(2) Normative Influence. People may wish to adhere to the 
majority in light of reputational concerns, fearing that deviat-
 
ING AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION COVERAGE (Paul J. Lavrakas and Jack K. 
Holley, eds., 1991). 
 36. Notably, there are also studies examining the effect of cognitive mech-
anisms on people’s policy preferences. See, e.g., Michael M. Bechtel et al., Real-
ity Bites: The Limits of Framing Effects for Salient and Contested Policy Is-
sues, 3 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 683, 689–93 (2015) (examining how voters 
respond to framing effects and partisan cues in their support for a referendum 
on immigration policy in Switzerland); Avital Moshinsky & Maya Bar-
Hillel, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Label Bias, 28 SOC. COGNITION 191, 193 
(2010) (revealing that people’s status quo bias and loss aversion affect their 
policy preferences, such that a policy’s attractiveness increases if it is per-
ceived as the status quo).  
 37. See, e.g., Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 311; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
WHICH NUDGES DO PEOPLE LIKE? A NATIONAL SURVEY 1, 5 (2015) [hereinaf-
ter SUNSTEIN, NATIONAL SURVEY]. See also Junghans et al., supra note 9, at 
11–13 (noting, for example, that “people readily distinguished marketing as a 
source of negative external influence, because unlike nudges, the targeted be-
haviors by marketing techniques were not always in the interests or ad-
vantage of the consumers”). 
 38. See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 
Q.J. ECON. 797, 802 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, 
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. 
ECON. 992, 993 (1992); Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, Rules of Thumb for 
Social Learning, 101 J. POL. ECON. 612, 613 (1993). See generally ROGER 
BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1986). 
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ing from the social norm may be costly insofar as it might gen-
erate social sanctions.39 
Interest in reputation is, of course, strongest if one ex-
presses one’s views in public. However, information about pub-
lic opinion can have force even if one’s views remain private. 
For example, empirical evidence indicates that environmental 
nudges, such as green defaults, can make people feel particu-
larly guilty about opting out if they think that there are strong 
moral justifications for accepting the default.40 Generally, it 
has been found that people feel shame when they violate social 
norms.41 People may therefore shift their opinion in order to 
avoid the feeling of shame that results from defying the social 
custom.42 
In the specific context of governmental policies, and espe-
cially nudges, people may choose to defer to the majority opin-
ion due to their respect for democratic self-government and ma-
jority rule in particular. Furthermore, information about 
 
 39. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Un-
employment May be One Consequence, 94 Q.J. ECON. 749, 766 (1980); Douglas 
B. Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841, 848 (1994). In 
particular, people may want to share the opinions of those they consider to be 
a part of their in-group, aspiring to be insiders rather than outsiders by es-
pousing the same views as their peers. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RA-
CHEL KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, 
WAGES AND WELL-BEING 28 (Princeton, 2010); See also Vincent Price, Social 
Identification and Public Opinion: Effects of Communicating Group Conflict, 
53 PUB. OPINION Q. 197, 198 (1989) (showing that when the opinions of specif-
ic groups are represented by the media, they may significantly influence the 
opinions of readers identifying with the relevant group). 
 40. See, e.g., Hedlin & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 129–30 (“Guilt . . . played 
an important role in our study, as participants who encountered the active-
choosing policy experienced relatively high levels of guilt.”); Aristeidis The-
otokis & Emmanouela Manganari, The Impact of Choice Architecture on Sus-
tainable Consumer Behavior: The Role of Guilt, 131 J. BUS. ETHICS 423, 426–
28 (2015) (studying interventions targeted at encouraging customers to reuse 
towels, and suggesting that guilt may significantly contribute to the effective-
ness of a towel reuse default, as “consumers experience higher levels of guilt in 
the opt-out policy, because the anticipated environmental harm is an outcome 
of their actions”). 
 41. JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS 
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 146–47 (rev. ed. 2015) (suggesting, inter alia, that 
“[n]orm violators may suffer guilt or shame, whereas those who observe the 
violation feel anger or contempt”). 
 42. See, e.g., Simon Hedlin, Is Guilt a Good Motivator for Pro-social Be-
haviour?: Using Choice Architecture to Promote Environmentally-Friendly Ac-
tions, ANGLE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.anglejournal.com/article/2015-10-is 
-guilt-a-good-motivator-for-pro-social-behaviour-using-choice-architecture-to 
-promote-environmentally-friendly-action. 
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majority opinion may send a signal not only as to the normative 
desirability of a certain policy, but also as to its potential effec-
tiveness, since an unpopular policy is likely to fail. 
All of these channels may operate either consciously or 
subconsciously and influence people’s policy attitudes in mean-
ingful ways, shifting their views in the direction of the majori-
ty. On the other hand, there is some evidence that when people 
are told that they hold a minority opinion they might show 
nonconformity or reactance, becoming entrenched in their con-
victions or self-consciously rejecting widespread views.43 For 
example, social identity research has found that when people 
have strong antecedent commitments, learning that they hold a 
minority opinion leads to greater engagement in actions that 
express those antecedent commitments.44 Some researchers 
have similarly found that when people’s attitudes are rooted in 
a strong moral stance that conflicts with the majority opinion, 
they report stronger intentions to behave publicly in accordance 
with their own values.45 
With these findings in mind, we tested whether people be-
longing to certain ideological groups exhibit nonconformity or 
reactance when informed that the position typically associated 
 
 43. See, e.g., Bechtel et al., supra note 36, at 684–85 (finding that voters 
tend to increase support for the position that corresponds to their preexisting 
partisan affiliations when faced with conflicting evidence or cues); Hornsey et 
al., supra note 4, at 333 (finding evidence that people “with a strong moral ba-
sis to their attitude intended to react against the group norm” (emphasis omit-
ted)).  
 44. See, for example, Barak-Corren et al., The Provocative Effect of Law: 
Majority Nationalism and Minority Discrimination 1, 23 (June 28, 2017) (un-
published working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994244 (finding that 
people who oppose “majority nationalism” laws respond to the enactment of 
such laws with a certain type of psychological reactance, becoming more inclu-
sive and generous toward the minorities whose freedoms are threatened). 
 45. Hornsey et al., supra note 4, at 333; Winnifred R. Louis et al., Speak-
ing Out on Immigration Policy in Australia: Identity Threat and the Interplay 
of Own Opinion and Public Opinion, 66 J. SOC. ISSUES 653, 670 (2010) (finding 
that in Australian immigration policies, people may be more willing to publicly 
express their opinions when they believe their views are becoming less popu-
lar, providing evidence for “active resistance” rather than “a spiral of silence”). 
But see Hornsey et al., Effects of Norms Among Those with Moral Conviction: 
Counter-Conformity Emerges on Intentions but Not Behaviors, 2 SOC. INFLU-
ENCE 244, 268 (2007) (finding that when looking at “speaking-out behaviors” 
rather than intentions, the counter-conformity patterns disappeared and con-
cluding that “participants with a strong moral basis for their attitudes intend-
ed to counter-conform, but when put in a position to act this resolve disap-
pears”).  
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with their ideological group conflicts with the majority opinion. 
We predicted that in the context of ideologically controversial 
policies (such as policies related to abortion), members of dif-
ferent ideological groups would exhibit reactance, such that 
their support of a policy in line with their ideological viewpoint 
will be higher when they learn that the majority opposes it 
than when they learn that the majority supports it. At the very 
least, we predicted that ideological group members will exhibit 
resistance to majority opinion, displaying similar support levels 
in such circumstances. 
II.  STUDY ONE: CONFORMITY AND REACTANCE   
In the first study, we examined whether the majority opin-
ion affects people’s attitudes and opinions when evaluating dif-
ferent public policies. Our hypotheses were twofold: 
(1) When asked to evaluate different governmental policies, 
people will be influenced by information about the majority 
opinion, shifting their attitudes in its direction. 
(2) People will exhibit nonconformity or reactance if the 
majority opinion conflicts with a fixed and firm conviction on 
their part.  
More specifically, we hypothesized that members of politi-
cally ideological groups will exhibit nonconformity or reactance 
if the majority opinion conflicts with a deeply held belief asso-
ciated with their ideological group. In other words, we predict-
ed that liberal and conservative participants will become even 
more committed to their views with respect to an ideologically 
controversial policy (such as a policy related to abortion) once 
they realize that they hold a minority position. Otherwise, we 
predicted that they will simply display nonconformity, resisting 
the influence of the majority opinion and remaining entrenched 
in their original position. 
A. SAMPLE AND DESIGN 
We recruited an online sample of 422 participants, using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.46 Participants who failed to answer 
 
 46. Amazon Mechanical Turk (“Mturk”) is an online marketplace giving 
“businesses and developers access to an on-demand, scalable workforce.” AMA-
ZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2018). It is commonly used by researchers to recruit participants in ex-
change for small sums of money. By now, Mturk has been studied extensively, 
and its population samples have been found to be more representative of the 
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all of the questions in the survey were excluded from the study. 
The final sample included 412 participants, who were all eight-
een years of age or older (46% were female and 77% were 
white). Within the sample, 49% of the participants identified as 
liberal, 27% identified as moderate, and 24% identified as con-
servative.47 
Participants were presented with six proposed policies de-
signed to address different issues and were instructed to as-
sume (hypothetically) that the government is considering 
whether to adopt them. As noted, we focused on “soft” interven-
tions in the form of nudges. A wide variety of issues and inter-
ventions were deliberately chosen so as to test the generaliza-
bility of our findings. For example, some policies involved 
“System 1” nudges, such as defaults or automatic enrollment 
plans, which target or benefit from an individual’s automatic 
processing, whereas other policies involved “System 2” nudges, 
like educational campaigns, which target or benefit from delib-
erative processing.48 The following policies were chosen and 
presented to participants in random order: 
 
national population than convenience samples (like undergraduates), although 
its respondents are generally “‘wealthier, younger, more educated, less racially 
diverse, and more Democratic’ than national samples.” Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, 
The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. 
REV. 117, 150 (2017) (citing Andrew R. Lewis et al., The (Non) Religion of Me-
chanical Turk Workers, 54 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 419, 419–20 (2015)). See 
also Kristin Firth et al., Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes Online, and Rep-
licates 1 (U. Pa. L. Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 17-38, 2017), https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=3020401 (finding that MTurk samples are “highly reliable 
and useful”). 
 47. Participants were asked to report their political ideology on a five-item 
scale, from very conservative to very liberal. Those who stated that they are 
either liberal or very liberal were categorized as liberals, those who indicated 
that they are either conservative or very conservative were categorized as con-
servative, and those who reported that they are moderate were categorized as 
such. We note that the sample is more liberal than the general population. See 
Lydia Saad, U.S. Conservatives Outnumber Liberals by Narrowing Mar-
gin, GALLUP NEWS (Jan. 3, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/201152/ 
conservative-liberal-gap-continues-narrow-tuesday.aspx (reporting the results 
of a 2016 poll in which 36% of Americans identified as conservative, 34% as 
moderate, and 25% as liberal). 
 48. System 1 refers to cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and 
unconscious, while System 2 is considered slow, deliberative, and conscious. 
For a general analysis of the distinction between System 1 and System 2, see 
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 1 (2011); Jonathan St. B. T. 
Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cogni-
tion, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 255 (2008). Some of the literature on nudging 
distinguishes between System 1 and System 2 nudges. See, e.g., Bubb, supra 
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Organ Donation. Participants were instructed to assume 
that the government is considering adopting a policy where 
Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) forms will ask new drivers 
if they wish to become organ donors, requiring them to check 
an opt-out box saying, “No, I do not wish to register at this 
time” if they do not wish to become donors, and automatically 
registering new drivers who do not check the box as organ do-
nors. 
Anti-abortion. Participants were instructed to assume that 
the government is considering adopting a policy that requires 
women to hear a fetus’ heartbeat before having an abortion. 
Last Name Change After Marriage. Participants were in-
structed to assume that the government is considering adopting 
a policy where women who get married take their husbands’ 
family name by default, unless they actively indicate that they 
wish to keep their maiden name. 
Green Energy. Participants were instructed to assume that 
the government is considering adopting a policy that requires 
large electricity providers to adopt a system in which consum-
ers would be automatically enrolled in a green (environmental-
ly friendly) energy supplier. Consumers could opt out if they 
wished. 
Retirement Savings. Participants were instructed to as-
sume that the government is considering requiring employers 
to adopt a system in which employees would be automatically 
enrolled in a pension plan. Employees could opt out if they 
wished. 
Gender Reassignment. Participants were instructed to as-
sume that the government is considering adopting a public ed-
ucation campaign informing people that it is possible for them 
to change their gender and explaining the possible clinical 
treatment available to this end. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions: (1) majority support or (2) majority opposition. In the ma-
jority-support condition, participants were instructed to as-
sume that most Americans supported each of the six policies, 
 
note 7, at 1026–28. System 1 nudges include graphic warnings, default rules, 
and automatic enrollment plans, while System 2 nudges include statistical in-
formation and factual disclosures. For empirical studies of people’s attitudes 
toward these two types of nudges, see, for example, Jung & Mellers, supra 
note 9, at 65–70; Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind of), 
66 DUKE L.J. 121, 155–57 (2016). 
 2018] SOCIAL INFLUENCE ON POLICY PREFERENCE 1355 
 
whereas in the majority-opposition condition, participants were 
instructed to assume that most Americans opposed them. For 
example, in the context of green energy, participants were in-
structed to assume either that most Americans support a policy 
requiring large electricity providers to adopt a system in which 
consumers would be automatically enrolled in a green energy 
supplier or that most Americans oppose such a policy. Partici-
pants were subsequently asked to indicate whether they sup-
ported or opposed the suggested policy on a five-item Likert 
scale (1 = strongly oppose; 3 = neither oppose nor support; 5 = 
strongly support). 
If the first hypothesis—that information about the majori-
ty opinion leads people to shift their policy views in the direc-
tion of the majority—is correct, then we should expect to see 
significantly higher levels of support when participants learn 
that most Americans support a proposed policy than when they 
learn that the majority of the public opposes it. 
As noted, our second hypothesis was that people may ex-
hibit nonconformity (no favorable reaction to the majority opin-
ion) or reactance (counter-conformity) if the majority opinion 
conflicts with a fixed and firm conviction on their part. In par-
ticular, we predicted that people will exhibit nonconformity or 
reactance if the majority opinion conflicts with a deeply held 
belief that they hold. To test the second hypothesis, partici-
pants were asked at the end of the survey to indicate their po-
litical ideology on a five-item Likert scale (1 = very liberal, 3 = 
moderate, 5 = very conservative). We then looked for interac-
tions between participants’ political ideology and the majority 
opinion treatment in the data gathered around participants’ 
support for the following ideologically controversial policies: an-
ti-abortion, gender reassignment, and last name change after 
marriage.  
With respect to reactance, we hypothesized that when in-
formed that they hold a minority position, people would in-
crease their support for a proposed policy that is consistent 
with their ideology, and likewise, increase their opposition to a 
proposed policy that conflicts with it. For example, we hypothe-
sized that when people who identify as liberal learn that they 
hold a minority position with respect to a proposed policy aimed 
to discourage women from pursuing abortion, they will increase 
their opposition to the policy, and that conservative partici-
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pants will accordingly increase their support for that policy 
once they realize that most Americans oppose it.49 
If the reactance hypothesis is correct, then we should ex-
pect to see higher levels of support for a conservative policy 
(like the anti-abortion nudge) among conservative participants 
when they learn that most Americans oppose the policy than 
when they learn that the majority of the public supports it. In a 
similar vein, we should expect to see higher levels of opposition 
to such a policy among liberal participants when they learn 
that most Americans support it than when they learn the oppo-
site.  
B. METHODS AND RESULTS 
We conducted two-sample t-tests comparing mean support 
scores across majority-opinion conditions (that is, majority sup-
port compared to majority opposition), as well as simple and 
multiple linear regressions to predict mean support scores from 
the majority opinion.50 In the multiple regression model, the 
dependent variable was subjects’ support for each proposed pol-
icy, reported on a five-item Likert scale, from strongly oppose to 
strongly support (hereafter “policy support score”). The inde-
pendent variable was the majority-opinion condition (majority 
support or majority opposition), and demographic factors (age, 
gender, political ideology, education, race, and income) were in-
cluded as controls.51 We also controlled for participants’ prelim-
inary opinions about each policy and the importance they at-
tributed to each issue.52 
 
 49. We had no clear hypothesis as to how moderate participants would 
react when they learned they hold a minority position. 
 50. See regression tables in the Appendices. 
 51. Political ideology, education, and income were treated as continuous 
variables. For example, political ideology was reported on a five-item scale 
from very liberal to very conservative. Race was transformed into a dummy 
variable (white and nonwhite) in light of the distribution of the sample (77% 
white, 8% African-American, 7% Asian, and a remaining mix of other catego-
ries). 
 52. For this purpose, participants were asked to state whether they agree 
or disagree with statements like “people are not saving enough for retirement” 
or “abortion is morally wrong” on a five-item Likert scale. We treated partici-
pants’ preliminary opinions as continuous variables. Participants were also 
asked to report how important each policy issue was to them on a five-item 
Likert scale. We treated importance as another continuous variable. It is im-
portant to note that participants were presented with these questions before 
they were asked for their opinion about the proposed policies. Admittedly, an-
swering these questions may have influenced participants’ responses concern-
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Our first hypothesis was that information about the major-
ity opinion will lead people to shift their policy views in the di-
rection of the majority. This hypothesis was supported by the 
results of four of the six policies proposed to participants. We 
found a significant effect in the expected direction for the organ 
donation policy, the green energy policy, the retirement savings 
policy, and the gender reassignment policy.53 However, we 
found no such effect for the anti-abortion and last-name-
change-after-marriage policies.54 We emphasize that even after 
controlling for participants’ preexisting opinions about abortion 
and women’s decisions to keep their maiden name, and for the 
importance they ascribed to each of these issues, the majority 
opinion had no significant effect on people’s judgments.55 Table 
1 shows mean support scores for each policy across the majori-
ty-support and majority-opposition conditions. 
 
ing their attitudes toward the proposed policies. It is therefore possible that 
participants showed stronger resistance to the majority-opinion treatment 
than they otherwise would have if they had not been primed to think about 
their opinions beforehand. 
 53. For organ donation: MSupport = 3.41, SD = 1.35; MOpposition = 3.11, 
SD = 1.37; t(412) = 2.17, p < 0.05. For green energy: MSupport = 3.9, SD = 1.11; 
MOpposition = 3.65, SD = 1.32; t(412) = 2.31, p < 0.05. For retirement savings: 
MSupport = 3.67, SD = 1.19; MOpposition = 3.48, SD = 1.18; t(412) = 1.65, p < 0.1 
(note that this difference is only marginally significant). For gender reassign-
ment: MSupport = 3.20, SD = 1.4; MOpposition = 2.92, SD = 1.43; t(412) = 1.97, p < 
0.05. 
 54. For anti-abortion: MSupport = 2.5, SD = 1.58; MOpposition = 2.55, SD = 1.53; 
t(412) = -0.57, p = 0.7. For last name change: MSupport = 2.5, SD = 1.33; MOpposi-
tion = 2.47, SD = 1.28; t(412) = 0.26, p = 0.4. 
 55. We controlled for participants’ preliminary opinions and the im-
portance they attached to these issues using a multiple linear regression mod-
el as described in the beginning of Part II.B. For coefficients and standard er-
rors, see Appendix I. Unsurprisingly, participants’ preliminary opinions 
significantly affected their support for the different policies in the predicted 
direction. For anti-abortion: b = 0.56; SE = 0.049; p < 0.01 and for last name 
change: b = 0.273; SE = 0.07; p < 0.01. 
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Table 1: Mean Support Scores Across Conditions and 
Policies 
Condition or Policy 
Majority 
Support 
Majority 
Opposition 
Significant 
Difference? 
Organ Donation 3.41 3.11 Yes (p < 0.05) 
Green Energy 3.9 3.65 Yes (p < 0.05) 
Retirement Savings 3.67 3.48 Marginally  
(p < 0.1) 
Gender Reassignment 3.2 2.92 Yes (p < 0.05) 
Last Name Change 2.5 2.47 No 
Anti-abortion 2.5 2.55 No 
 
Since it can be difficult to interpret the magnitude of the 
effect by looking solely at the differences in mean support 
scores, we also compared participants’ attitudes in terms of 
percentages of support. We did this by dichotomizing partici-
pants’ responses on the five-point support scale and dividing 
participants into two groups: supporters and opponents. The 
scale was dichotomized such that participants who indicated 
that they supported or strongly supported a policy (four or five 
on the scale) were classified as supporters, and participants 
who either opposed or neither supported nor opposed the policy 
were classified as opponents. Figure 1 below shows the differ-
ence in support rates under the majority-support and majority-
opposition conditions.56 
 
 56. Note that because Figure 1 shows proportions of support, each bar im-
plicitly communicates the proportion of opposition which can be calculated by 
subtracting the percent of support from one hundred. 
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31%
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36%
29%
25%
Green Energy Retirement
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Organ
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Gender
Reassignment
Anti-Abortion Last Name
Majority Support Majority Opposition
Figure 1: Support Rates for Policies Across Majority 
Opinion Conditions 
 
Figure 1 reveals that the proportions of participants sup-
porting the organ donation, green energy, retirement savings, 
and gender reassignment policies were significantly larger in 
the majority-support condition than in the majority-opposition 
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17%
38%
51%
17%
23%
62%
Liberals Moderates Conservatives
Majority Opposition Majority Support
condition.57 By contrast, there were no significant differences 
across conditions in proportion of support for the anti-abortion 
and last-name-change-after-marriage policies.  
As noted, our second hypothesis was that members of dif-
ferent ideological groups might exhibit nonconformity or reac-
tance. In order to test this hypothesis, we also examined inter-
actions between participants’ political ideology and the 
majority opinion treatment in the anti-abortion, last name 
change, and gender reassignment policies. 
The results were somewhat puzzling. They revealed a sig-
nificant interaction only in the domain of the anti-abortion pol-
icy, and even there, the pattern was complex and not what we 
anticipated. Conservative and liberal participants displayed 
statistically equivalent levels of support under the majority-
support and the majority-opposition conditions. By contrast, 
moderate participants became marginally significantly more 
likely to oppose the anti-abortion policy when informed that 
most Americans supported the policy than when informed that 
most Americans opposed it. Figure 2, below, shows these re-
sults. 
 
Figure 2: Anti-abortion Policy: Interaction Between 
Majority Opinion and Political Ideology 
 
 57. Using a chi-square test, the differences across conditions in the green 
energy, retirement savings, organ donation, and gender reassignment policies 
are significant at the 5% level. 
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This figure illustrates support rates across conditions for 
subjects identifying as liberal, moderate, and conservative. The 
figure reveals that 62% of the conservative subjects were sup-
portive of the anti-abortion policy when informed that most 
Americans supported it, compared to 51% who supported the 
policy when informed that most Americans opposed it. Im-
portantly, however, this difference was not significant, thus 
suggesting nonconformity.58 Like the conservatives, the liberal 
participants displayed nonconformity: they remained en-
trenched in their position, retaining similar levels of low sup-
port under both majority opinion conditions.59 In contrast, the 
moderate participants seemed to exhibit reactance: while 38% 
of moderates were supportive of the anti-abortion policy when 
informed that most Americans opposed it, the level of support 
for this policy was marginally significantly smaller (23%) when 
subjects were informed that most Americans supported it.60 
We do not have an explanation for the surprising difference 
between moderate and liberal participants on this score (and 
would not draw general lessons from it), except for a possible 
“floor effect”: the possibility that since liberals were extremely 
hostile toward the anti-abortion policy, the results would not be 
likely to show a significantly higher level of opposition under 
the majority-support condition, when compared to the majority-
opposition condition. 
III.  STUDY TWO: THE ROLE OF ANTECEDENT 
CONVICTIONS   
The findings of the first study suggest that in certain do-
mains, the majority opinion matters and it increases or de-
creases individual support for a policy. In other domains, the 
majority opinion has no such effect. These findings raise a nat-
ural question: What accounts for the variation in the effect of 
majority opinion across policies? 
Preliminarily, we note that the anti-abortion and last 
name-change-after-marriage policies are plausibly seen to 
 
 58. Under a chi-square test of the difference in support rates among con-
servatives across the majority-opinion conditions, χ2(1) = 1.3, p = 0.2613 for 
the difference in support rates. 
  59. Under a chi-square test of the difference in support rates among liber-
als across the majority-opinion conditions, χ2(1) = 0.004, p = 0.95. 
 60. Under a chi-square test of the difference in support rates among mod-
erates across the majority-opinion conditions, χ2(1) = 3.02, p = 0.08. 
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share a common characteristic when compared to green energy, 
retirement savings, and organ donation; the former are more 
likely associated with core ideological and moral convictions.61 
This difference between the two groups of policies makes it 
plausible to hypothesize that people typically feel more strongly 
about the former policy issues than about the latter. The re-
sults may therefore be interpreted as supporting a hypothesis 
that fits with other findings: informing people about the major-
ity opinion is likely to move their attitudes toward public poli-
cies when they lack firm convictions, but will have a lesser or 
no effect when they have such convictions.62 Drawing on the 
findings of the first study, we tested this hypothesis with a sec-
ond experiment. 
A. PRETEST SURVEY OF PEOPLE’S CONVICTIONS 
We began by conducting a pretest survey aimed at identify-
ing two types of policies: (1) policies for which people generally 
have clear convictions; and (2) policies for which people gener-
ally lack clear convictions. Because we were interested in un-
derstanding how strongly participants felt about the different 
policy issues, we held the type of policy tool constant—an edu-
cational campaign consisting of vivid stories and images—and 
varied only the policy objectives.63 
The sample of the pretest survey consisted of 428 partici-
pants obtained through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (eighteen 
years of age or older; 47% female; 76% white). Participants 
were instructed to assume that the government is considering 
different public policies and were subsequently asked how 
 
 61. Admittedly, gender reassignment can also be seen as tightly related to 
moral perceptions, but as the policy was only meant to “inform people about 
the possibility of changing their gender,” it may have been seen as less ideolog-
ically controversial than policies requiring women to hear fetus’ heartbeat be-
fore having an abortion or defaulting married women to bear their husbands’ 
family name.  
 62. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., JUDGES, supra note 10, at 147–50. 
 63. The nine policy objectives examined in the pretest study were: (1) to 
encourage women to refrain from having abortions; (2) to encourage people to 
support the legalization of physician-assisted suicide nationwide; (3) to en-
courage people to refrain from discriminating against others on the basis of 
sexual orientation; (4) to encourage people to refrain from having a baby out-
side of marriage; (5) to encourage people to refrain from smoking; (6) to en-
courage people to refrain from overeating; (7) to encourage people to buy fuel-
efficient cars; (8) to encourage people to register as organ donors; and (9) to 
encourage people to refrain from texting while driving. 
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strongly they felt about these policies (on a five-item Likert 
scale from not at all strongly to extremely strongly) and how re-
lated their position was to their core values, beliefs, and convic-
tions (on a five-item Likert scale from not at all related to ex-
tremely related). We then combined these items to form an 
opinion strength index, with higher scores meaning that partic-
ipants had, on average, firm and fixed opinions concerning the 
relevant policy issue. Although there is no single agreed-upon 
operationalization of attitude or opinion strength, these (or sim-
ilar) items, measuring attitude extremity and centrality, are 
commonly used in psychological studies.64 
Since we were interested in examining whether the majori-
ty opinion effect interacts with attitude strength, we used the 
two policies with the highest opinion-strength scores (the anti-
abortion and sexual orientation antidiscrimination policies) and 
the two policies with the lowest opinion-strength scores (the 
fuel efficiency and anti-obesity policies) in the second experi-
ment.65 
Participants were instructed to assume that the govern-
ment is considering the following public education campaigns: 
Anti-Abortion. A campaign designed to encourage women 
to refrain from having an abortion. 
Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination. A campaign de-
signed to encourage people to refrain from discriminating 
against others on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Fuel Efficiency. A campaign designed to encourage people 
to buy fuel-efficient cars. 
 
 64. See, e.g., Robert P. Abelson, Attitude Extremity, in ATTITUDE 
STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 25 (Richard E. Petty & Jon A. 
Krosnick eds., 1995); ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF ATTITUDES 29 (1993); Charles M. Judd & Markus Brauer, Repetition and 
Evaluative Extremity, in ATTITUDE STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSE-
QUENCES 43 (Richard E. Petty & Jon A. Krosnick eds., 1995); Charles M. Judd 
& Jon A. Krosnick, Attitude Centrality, Organization, and Measurement, 42 J. 
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 445 (1982); Hornsey et al., supra note 4, at 
324 (measuring moral basis for attitude). For an overview of the different op-
erationalization methods for attitude strength, see Linda J. Skitka et al., Mor-
al Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something More?, 
88 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 895, 895–96 (2005). 
 65. The differences in opinion strength scores were significant across all 
nine policies, yet we chose the two with the highest scores (anti-abortion, with 
an opinion strength score of 3.74, and sexual orientation antidiscrimination, 
with an opinion strength score of 3.60 on a five-item scale) and the two with 
the lowest ones (fuel efficiency, with an opinion strength score of 2.89, and an-
ti-obesity, with an opinion strength score of 2.84). 
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81%
15%
4%
Support Oppose Undecided
Anti-Obesity. A campaign designed to encourage people to 
refrain from overeating. 
B. SAMPLE & DESIGN 
The sample of the second study included 804 Amazon Me-
chanical Turk participants (eighteen years of age or older; 53% 
female; 75% white). As in the first experiment, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions—majority 
support and majority opposition. In each condition, participants 
were asked about four proposed education campaigns (present-
ed in randomized order): the two that received the highest opin-
ion-strength score (the anti-abortion and sexual orientation an-
tidiscrimination campaigns) and the two that received the 
lowest opinion-strength score (the fuel efficiency and anti-
obesity campaigns) in the pretest survey. 
In Study 1, we simply instructed participants to assume 
that most Americans supported or opposed each considered pol-
icy. In Study 2, by contrast, we used numeric figures and a 
graphic illustration in order to make the majority opinion in-
formation more realistic, vivid, and salient. In the majority-
support condition, participants were instructed to assume that 
according to a recent survey, 81% of Americans support the 
proposed campaign, 15% oppose it and 4% are undecided, 
whereas under the majority-opposition condition they were in-
structed to assume that according to a recent survey, 81% of 
Americans opposed the policy, 15% support it, and 4% are un-
decided. Participants were also presented with the below 
graphic illustration of the hypothetical opinion poll results. 
 
Illustration 1: Hypothetical Opinion Poll Results Given 
to Participants 
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Under both majority opinion conditions, participants were 
asked to indicate whether they supported or opposed the pro-
posed campaign on a five-item Likert scale (from strongly op-
pose to strongly support). We hypothesized that there would be 
a significant interaction between the majority opinion treat-
ment and attitude strength, such that the majority opinion ef-
fect for the policies receiving the lowest opinion-strength scores 
(the fuel efficiency and anti-obesity policies) would be signifi-
cantly greater than the effect for the policies receiving the 
highest opinion-strength scores (the anti-abortion and sexual 
orientation antidiscrimination policies). 
C. METHODS & RESULTS 
We conducted two-sample t-tests comparing mean support 
scores across majority-opinion conditions (that is, majority sup-
port compared to majority opposition), as well as simple and 
multiple linear regressions.66 In the multiple linear regression 
model, the dependent variable was policy support score and the 
independent variable was the majority-opinion condition (ma-
jority support or majority opposition). Demographic factors 
(age, gender, political ideology, education, race, and income), as 
well as participants’ preliminary opinion about the issue, were 
included as controls.67 
Using a mixed-effects model, we also regressed partici-
pants’ support score on the majority opinion treatment, the at-
titude strength (high-opinion strength or low-opinion strength), 
and the interaction between these two variables. 
In this study, the majority opinion had a significant effect 
on support scores across all policies except for the anti-abortion 
policy.68 To that extent, the findings provide strong support for 
 
 66. See regression tables in Appendix 2. 
 67. As in the first experiment, age, education, income, political ideology, 
and preliminary opinion were treated as continuous variables, and race was 
transformed into a dummy variable (White or Nonwhite) in light of the distri-
bution of the sample. 
 68. For anti-abortion, MOpposition = 2.46, SD = 1.52; MSupport = 2.62, 
SD = 1.48; t(802) = -1.46, (p = 0.14). Under a simple linear regression, 
b = 0.155; SE = 0.106; p = 0.14. Yet, when controlling for demographics and 
preliminary opinion, the effect of the majority opinion treatment becomes sig-
nificant at the 5% level. For the anti-obesity policy, MOpposition = 3.5, SD = 1.27; 
MSupport = 4.01, SD = 1.1; t(802) = -6.09, p < 0.001. Under a simple linear re-
gression, b = 0.47; SE = 0.08; p < 0.001. For the sexual orientation antidiscrim-
ination policy, MOpposition = 3.94, SD = 1.3; MSupport = 4.26, SD = 1.13; t(802) = -
3.7, p < 0.001. Under a simple linear regression, b = 0.24; SE = 0.07; p < 0.001. 
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our first hypothesis in Study 1: People generally shift their pol-
icy judgments in the direction of the majority. Table 2 shows 
mean support scores under both majority opinion conditions 
across the four policies. 
 
Table 2: Mean Support Scores across Conditions and 
Policies 
 
Policy 
Opinion 
Strength 
Score 
 Majori-
ty Sup-
port 
 Majority 
Opposition 
Significant 
Difference? 
Anti-Abortion 3.74 2.62 
(1.48) 
2.46 
(1.52) 
No 
(p < 0.14) 
Sexual Orien-
tation 
3.6 4.26 
(1.13) 
3.94 
(1.3) 
Yes 
(p < 0.001) 
Fuel Efficiency 2.89 4.00 
(1.1) 
3.68 
(1.19) 
Yes 
(p < 0.001) 
Anti-Obesity 2.84 4.01 
(1.1) 
3.5 
(1.27) 
Yes 
(p < 0.001) 
 
As in Study 1, we also dichotomized the scales by the scale 
midpoint to produce binary support or disapproval decisions. 
Participants who indicated that they (either somewhat or 
strongly) supported a policy (4 or 5 on the scale) were classified 
as supporters, allowing us to compare support rates across ma-
jority opinion conditions. 
Figure 3 shows the observed differences in support rates 
across majority opinion conditions and policies, from the policy 
obtaining the lowest opinion-strength score (the anti-obesity 
policy) on the left to the policy obtaining the highest opinion-
strength score (the anti-abortion policy) on the right. 
 
For the fuel efficiency policy, MOpposition = 3.68, SD = 1.19; MSupport = 4.00, 
SD = 1.1; t(802) = -3.95, p < 0.001. Under a simple linear regression, b = 0.265; 
SE = 0.07; p < 0.001. 
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Proposed Policies (from low to high opinion-strength score)
Majority Support Majority Opposition
Figure 3: Support Rates for Policies across 
Majority Opinion Conditions 
 
As Figure 3 illustrates, support rates remained almost con-
stant across conditions in the context of the anti-abortion policy 
(30% support under the majority-support condition, compared 
to 27% support under the majority-opposition condition), but 
they varied across conditions in the context of the three re-
maining policies.69 Notably, the largest difference was observed 
in the context of the anti-obesity campaign, which obtained the 
lowest opinion-strength score. While 74% of subjects supported 
it under the majority-support condition, only 59% supported it 
under the majority-opposition condition.70 
We found qualified support for our central hypothesis in 
Study 2. The effect of majority opinion on support score was 
significantly larger in the lowest opinion strength policy (anti-
obesity) than in the highest opinion strength policy (anti-
abortion) (p < 0.002). At the same time, the interaction between 
the policy type (high versus low opinion-strength score) and 
majority opinion treatment was only marginally significant (p = 
 
 69. The differences across conditions in the anti-obesity, fuel efficiency, 
and sexual orientation antidiscrimination policies are significant at the 1% 
level. The difference across conditions in the anti-abortion policy is not signifi-
cant (p = 0.14). 
 70. χ2(1) = 103.22, p < 0.001. 
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0.057). Moreover, the difference in the effect of majority opinion 
on support scores for the sexual orientation antidiscrimination 
and for the fuel efficiency policies was insignificant (p < 0.9).71  
We therefore note a challenge for our hypothesis, which is 
that support rates were not differently affected by majority 
opinion in the context of the sexual orientation antidiscrimina-
tion and the fuel efficiency policies. It is possible that while 
many people have strong initial commitments with respect to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, they are also 
aware that norms have been changing on that issue. It follows 
that they might be attentive to public opinion, even if they 
begin with strong antecedent convictions (note as well that the 
opinion strength score was stronger for the anti-abortion policy 
than for the sexual orientation antidiscrimination policy). 
IV.  STUDY THREE: NUDGES VERSUS BANS   
The third study was designed to test whether exposure to 
majority opinion influences people’s attitudes not only toward 
the policy objectives, but also toward the policy tools by which 
the objectives are to be advanced. Put differently, our question 
here is whether the effect of the majority opinion differs across 
different regulatory tools, even if we hold the policy objective 
constant. We are particularly interested in comparing soft tools 
(nudges), like educational campaigns or graphic warnings, to 
more coercive tools, like mandates or bans. Can people be 
nudged to favor or oppose nudges? To favor or oppose bans? 
Drawing on the findings of our second study, our hypothe-
sis was that if people strongly support or oppose a certain poli-
cy tool, they will be reluctant to adjust their evaluation of a cer-
tain policy toward the direction of the majority, keeping the 
policy objective constant. In other words, we hypothesized that, 
in the context of policy tools about which people typically have 
strong and well-formed opinions, the majority opinion will gen-
erate a lesser effect than in the context of tools about which 
people do not feel as strongly. 
 
 71. Under a mixed-effect model, the marginal means of support score for 
each policy under the two majority opinion treatments were computed, and the 
difference between the difference in means for majority support and majority 
opposition under the sexual orientation antidiscrimination and fuel efficiency 
policies was insignificant (b = 0.001; SE = 0.11; p < 0.9). 
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Preliminary research suggests that Americans prefer 
nudges to bans.72 Moreover, increasing evidence suggests that 
Americans do not oppose or support nudges as such, but are 
usually influenced above all by the goal that particular nudges 
aim to advance.73 
Building on this evidence, we hypothesized that in general, 
(a) people will be influenced by the majority opinion in their 
support for proposed nudges; and (b) will be significantly more 
supportive of nudges when they learn that most Americans fa-
vor them. We also hypothesized that the majority opinion will 
have a lesser effect on people’s willingness to support bans (as-
suming that both are set to advance the same policy objectives). 
A second goal of this study was to examine whether peo-
ple’s views about apparently paternalistic governmental inter-
ventions interact with the majority opinion treatment, and to 
compare this interaction across the different policy tools. For 
this purpose, participants were asked to indicate on a five-item 
Likert scale whether they agree or disagree that “the govern-
ment should prevent people from hurting themselves, even if 
that includes forcing them to act, or refrain from acting, accord-
ing to their best interests” (1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neither 
agree nor disagree; 5 = strongly agree).74 This question allowed 
 
 72. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT 
IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 135 (2016) (“[M]any people do oppose 
mandates as such, even when they are enthusiastic about the underlying ends, 
and are supportive of nudges that are designed to promote those ends.”). See 
also Arad & Rubinstein, supra note 9, at 20 (finding that when holding the 
policy objective constant, people in the U.S., Germany, and Israel generally 
prefer “softer” interventions to more coercive interventions in the form of tax-
es or bans). For a discussion of a similar finding within Denmark, see Sofie 
Kragh Pederson et al. Who Wants Paternalism, 66 BULL. ECON. RES. S147 
(2014). 
 73. See SUNSTEIN, NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 37, at 14–15; Tannen-
baum et al., supra note 31, at 1. Most strikingly, Tannenbaum et al. found 
that people are significantly more likely to approve of nudges as general policy 
tools when they favor the particular political objectives used to illustrate them 
or the policymakers that applied them. They also found that people’s attitudes 
toward the policy objectives promoted by the nudge were a far stronger predic-
tor than their attitudes towards the role of government in protecting people 
from harming themselves. Although libertarians were significantly less sup-
portive of nudges than paternalists, individual differences in attitudes toward 
the policy objectives of the nudges were significantly more predictive of peo-
ple’s support for proposed nudges. 
 74. This statement is a variation of items used by Kahan et al. to measure 
participants’ worldviews. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of 
Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 173 (2011). 
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us to explore whether the majority opinion interacts with peo-
ple’s judgments about the acceptability of paternalistic gov-
ernmental intervention. 
In order to facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the 
results, participants were divided into three groups according 
to their responses: (1) participants who either strongly or 
somewhat agreed that the government should prevent people 
from hurting themselves were classified as “coercive paternal-
ists”; (2) participants who strongly or somewhat disagreed with 
that statement were classified as “libertarians”; and (3) partici-
pants who neither agreed nor disagreed were classified as “neu-
tral.” In our sample, there were 42.5% libertarians (225 partic-
ipants), 16% neutrals (86 participants), and 41.5% coercive 
paternalists (219 participants). 
We hypothesized, with some tentativeness, that when 
asked to evaluate a coercive paternalistic policy (as we call it), 
both libertarians and coercive paternalists (as we call them) 
would show either reactance or nonconformity to the majority 
opinion. In short, libertarians would become more hostile to-
wards the proposed policy when informed that most Americans 
support it, whereas coercive paternalists would become more 
extreme in their support of the policy when learning that most 
Americans oppose it. More weakly, we hypothesized that par-
ticipants who fell in these categories might simply fail to con-
form to the majority opinion in the context of coercive paternal-
istic policies, in light of their strong antecedent convictions on 
the matter. 
A. SAMPLE AND DESIGN 
The sample consisted of 533 participants from Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (eighteen years of age or older, 41% female; 62% 
white). Overall design was a fully crossed two (policy tool: ban 
or nudge) by two (majority opinion: majority support or majori-
ty opposition) between-subjects design. For the purpose of ex-
amining how people’s views of certain policy tools interact with 
the majority opinion treatment, we held the policy objective (to 
discourage people from smoking) constant across conditions. To 
keep the analysis as simple as possible, we studied only one 
policy area (cigarette smoking), acknowledging that a full ac-
count would require a far broader range of areas. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two policy 
tool conditions. In the nudge condition they were instructed to 
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assume that the government is considering requiring graphic 
warnings on cigarette packages, whereas in the ban condition 
they were instructed to assume that the government is consid-
ering adopting a ban on cigarette smoking. Participants read as 
follows: 
Ban Condition. “Assume that the federal government is 
considering adopting a total ban on cigarette smoking. This 
means that the sale of cigarettes will be outlawed.” 
Nudge Condition. “Assume that the federal government is 
considering requiring graphic warnings on cigarette packages. 
The proposed warnings will include pictures of people suffering 
from smoking-related diseases, such as cancer.” 
Under both the ban and the nudge conditions, participants 
were instructed to assume that they were part of a national 
survey concerning public behavior and attitudes regarding 
smoking. They were provided various pieces of information 
about Americans’ smoking habits and were subsequently ran-
domly assigned to one of two majority opinion conditions: ma-
jority support and majority opposition (as in Study 2).75 They 
were then asked to indicate whether they supported or opposed 
the proposed policy on a five-item Likert scale (1 = strongly op-
pose; 3 = neither support nor oppose; 5 = strongly support). 
B. METHODS AND RESULTS 
We conducted two-sample t-tests comparing mean support 
scores across majority-opinion conditions (that is, majority sup-
port compared to majority opposition), as well as simple and 
multiple linear regressions.76 In the multiple linear regression 
model, the dependent variable was support score toward each 
proposed policy, and the independent variable was the majority 
opinion condition (majority support or majority opposition). 
Participants’ views with respect to paternalism (libertarian, 
neutral, or coercive paternalist), demographic factors (age, gen-
der, political ideology, education, race, and income), and partic-
ipants’ preliminary opinion about the issue, were included as 
 
 75. Under the “majority support” condition, they were instructed to as-
sume that 81% of Americans support the proposed policy, 15% oppose it and 
4% are undecided, whereas under the “majority opposition” condition they 
were instructed to assume that 81% of Americans oppose the policy, 15% sup-
port it and 4% are undecided. Under both conditions, participants were also 
presented with a graphic illustration of the results, as in Study 2. 
 76. See regression tables in the appendices. 
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controls. An interaction term between paternalistic ideology 
and the majority opinion treatment was also included. 
As expected, information about the majority opinion signif-
icantly influenced people’s attitudes toward the proposed 
nudge. Support scores under the majority-support treatment 
were significantly higher than under the majority-opposition 
treatment.77 By contrast, the majority opinion did not signifi-
cantly change people’s views with respect to the proposed ban. 
Table 3 shows mean support scores under both majority opin-
ion conditions across the two policy tools. 
 
Table 3: Mean Support Scores across Conditions and 
Tools 
 
Policy Tool 
Majority 
Support 
Majority 
Opposition 
Significant 
Difference? 
Nudge 4.1 3.8 Yes (p < 0.05) 
Ban 3.4 3.3 No 
 
In terms of support rates (that is, percentages of support 
for the policies), we find similar results. Figure 4 illustrates 
these findings. It shows differences in support rates across the 
different policies (supporters are those who indicated that they 
either somewhat or strongly supported the policy). 
 
 77. Under a multiple linear regression of support scores, b (for the majori-
ty opinion treatment) = 0.305; SE = 0.151; p < 0.05. 
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Figure 4: Support Rates across Conditions - 
Nudge versus Ban 
 
Figure 4 shows that while the difference in support is sig-
nificant under the nudge condition, there is no significant dif-
ference in support under the ban condition. Support rates for 
the graphic-warning nudge were significantly higher under the 
majority-support than under the majority-opposition condition 
(79% and 67%, respectively). By contrast, they remained almost 
constant (and were not significantly different) in the context of 
a total ban on cigarette smoking (55% under majority opposi-
tion versus 59% under majority support). 
C. CONFORMITY & REACTANCE 
We also explored whether the effect of the majority opinion 
treatment on participants’ support for the suggested policies is 
moderated by their ideological views on paternalistic govern-
mental interventions. Recall in this regard that participants 
were asked to indicate on a five-item Likert scale whether they 
agreed or disagreed that “the government should prevent peo-
ple from hurting themselves, even if that includes forcing them 
to act, or refrain from acting, according to their best interests.” 
As noted, they were categorized as libertarian, neutral, or coer-
cive paternalist according to their responses. 
79%
59%
67%
55%
Graphic Warning Ban
Majority Support Majority Opposition
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32%
75% 79%
24%
43%
91%
Libertarian Neutral Paternalist
Majority Support Majority Opposition
Predictably, libertarians were significantly more support-
ive of the nudge than the ban, and coercive paternalists were 
significantly more supportive of both the nudge and the ban 
than were libertarians. Table 4 shows percentages of support 
for each policy tool among libertarians and coercive paternal-
ists. 
 
Table 4: Percentages of Support for Each Tool:  
Libertarians v. Coercive Paternalists 
Percentage of Policy Support 
Nudge 
(Graphic Warnings) Ban 
Libertarians 63% 28% 
Coercive Paternalists 82% 85% 
 
Notably, ideology concerning governmental intervention 
was a significantly stronger predictor of support scores for the 
ban than for the nudge.78 
Under the ban scenario, we found a significant interaction 
between participants’ views about paternalism and the majori-
ty opinion treatment. Figure 5 below shows these results. 
 
Figure 5: Do you Support or Oppose the Proposed Ban 
on Smoking? 
 
 78. The standardized coefficient of paternalistic ideology was 2.8 times 
bigger in the ban condition than in the nudge condition (z-statistics were 10.59 
and 3.81, respectively). 
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Figure 5 displays support rates across conditions for those 
characterized as libertarians, neutrals, and coercive paternal-
ists under the ban scenario. The neutrals were significantly in-
fluenced by the majority opinion in the predicted direction, dis-
playing significantly higher levels of support under the 
majority-support treatment than under the majority-opposition 
treatment (75% versus 43%).79 By contrast, libertarians were 
not significantly affected by the majority opinion treatment. 
Their levels of support under the majority-support condition 
were not significantly different from their support levels under 
the majority-opposition condition (32% versus 24%).80 Coercive 
paternalists, however, were significantly more supportive of the 
ban when informed that most Americans opposed it than when 
informed of the opposite (91%, compared to 79%). This differ-
ence strongly indicates reactance.81  
Figure 6 displays support rates across majority opinion 
conditions for those characterized as libertarians, neutrals, and 
coercive paternalists under the nudge scenario. As this figure 
illustrates, support rates for the nudge among neutral partici-
pants significantly differed across conditions: 85% of the neu-
tral participants supported the nudge under the majority-
support condition, compared to only 62% in the majority-
opposition condition.82 In contrast, support rates among coer-
cive paternalists were not significantly different across majori-
ty opinion conditions: 80% of coercive paternalists supported 
the nudge under the majority-opposition condition, compared to 
83% under the majority-support condition.83 
 
 79. b = 0.38; SE = 0.16; p < 0.05 for support rates (χ2(1) = 3.93, p < 0.05). 
In terms of support scores, F(1, 36) = 5.78, p < 0.05. 
 80. χ2(1) = 0.83, p = 0.36 for support rates; F(1, 116) = 0.11, p = 0.74 for 
support scores. 
 81. b = -0.15; SE = 0.07; p < 0.05 for support rates; and b = -1.576; 
SE = .446; p < 0.01 for support scores (F(1, 108) = 4.85, p < 0.05). 
 82. t(46) = 1.87, df = 46, p < 0.05.  
 83. b = 0.04; SE = 0.07; p = 0.58. 
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Figure 6: Do you Support or Oppose the Proposed 
Graphic Warnings? 
 
As illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, libertarians displayed 
significantly higher levels of support under the majority-
support condition than its opposite in the context of a nudge,84 
but retained similar levels of opposition to the ban across ma-
jority opinion conditions (the difference in support rates was 
not significant). This finding suggests that their opposition to 
bans (at least in the context of cigarette smoking) is fixed and 
firm. 
V.  DISCUSSION   
We find that people’s policy judgments are significantly af-
fected by information about the majority opinion. Across a wide 
range of policies, people’s evaluations shift as a result of learn-
ing what most other Americans think. These findings comple-
ment a long line of literature documenting the impact of social 
norms on people’s judgments and decisions. The findings reveal 
that even in the context of policy judgments, people are affected 
by the majority opinion in significant ways. On policies related 
 
 84. b = 0.18; SE = 0.09; p < 0.05. 
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to retirement savings, obesity, fuel efficiency, organ donation, 
and even discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, lev-
els of support were significantly influenced by people’s percep-
tion of majority opinion—sometimes enough to turn minority 
support into majority support, or vice-versa. 
At the same time, our findings provide evidence that if 
people hold strong antecedent convictions on a certain policy 
objective, they are less likely to be influenced by what the ma-
jority thinks. On policies related to abortion, for example, we 
found no significant difference in support levels across majority 
opinion conditions. When people’s convictions are fixed and 
firm, they are less likely to be moved by the majority’s view. 
While this conclusion is not especially surprising, it has the vir-
tue of specifying the boundary condition for our central findings 
here. 
At least in the context of smoking, we find the same basic 
results for policy tools. The implication is that while people’s 
perceptions of public opinion will not significantly affect their 
attitudes toward policy tools about which they already have a 
fixed opinion, it will likely affect people’s attitudes when they 
lack such an opinion.85 In the context of the proposed ban on 
smoking, participants who did not have a strong position about 
paternalistic governmental interventions were significantly af-
fected by the majority opinion, shifting their views in its direc-
tion. By contrast, libertarians remained firm in their opposition 
to a total ban on smoking, and coercive paternalists exhibited 
reactance, demonstrating greater support for the proposed ban 
when informed that they hold a minority position than when 
informed the opposite.  
Admittedly, the paper’s findings are preliminary and 
should be taken with caution. We explored a limited number of 
objectives and tools, and we did not always find reactance or 
conformity when we expected to find one or the other. As we 
have emphasized, it is possible that in certain domains, partic-
ipants may have found it difficult to assume that the majority 
supports or opposes a certain policy; this raises questions as to 
whether our experimental manipulation always worked as 
planned. Future research would help verify the robustness and 
generalizability of our results. 
 
 85. For a similar finding, see Tannenbaum et al., supra note 31. 
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Several future research directions would be valuable. First, 
it would be useful to learn more about the relative effect of dif-
ferent social identity groups on people’s policy preferences. In 
this study, we looked only at the impact of exposure to the ma-
jority opinion within American society on people’s policy prefer-
ences. But people may well be strongly influenced by the opin-
ion of members of social identity groups to which they feel more 
tightly connected, such as peers, friends, or groups holding the 
same ideological or political viewpoint.86 In short, the source of 
opinion matters, not merely the number of people who hold it. 
Second, it would be valuable to make more progress in 
specifying the mechanisms underlying social influences: Are 
people influenced by the majority opinion for informational or 
normative reasons? Do people wish to adhere to the wisdom of 
the crowds or do they fear that deviating from the prevailing 
viewpoint might generate social sanctions? These questions 
might be answered by manipulating the source of the social 
norms information in an experimental setting. 
Third, it is important to make more progress in under-
standing the kinds of situations in which people are likely to 
exhibit reactance or counter-conformity. Our findings provide 
preliminary evidence that people can resist, or even react 
against, the majority opinion in the context of both policy tools 
and objectives about which they feel strongly. In the future, it 
should be possible to map the policy issues and tools in which 
information about the majority opinion might generate reac-
tance or counter-conformity.  
  CONCLUSION   
We find that exposure to information about the majority 
opinion can significantly influence people’s policy preferences. 
In short, people can be nudged to favor or to oppose nudges. 
But there are important qualifications. 
In policy domains in which people lack fixed and firm con-
victions, information about the majority opinion is highly likely 
to affect people’s support for particular policies. By contrast, 
such an effect is less likely in domains in which people have 
firm antecedent convictions. In such contexts, exposure to the 
 
 86. See, e.g., Deborah J. Terry et al., Attitude-Behaviour Relations: The 
Role of In-group Norms and Mode of Behavioural Decision-making, 39 BRIT. J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 337, 337 (2000). 
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majority opinion might even generate reactance among those 
who reject that opinion. 
Preliminary and partial though they are, these findings of-
fer a general lesson: Social norms—particularly majority opin-
ion—can be powerful tools for policymakers. If their goal is to 
increase people’s support for a certain policy, they might be 
able to make progress simply by informing them that many or 
most people already support it. At the same time, the findings 
offer a clear warning: If people’s convictions are fixed and firm, 
that information may have no effect—and it might even be 
counterproductive. 
